This paper addresses the tension between performance ranking systems and genuine meritocratic outcomes in modern economies. The author argues that ranking-driven imitation of top performers is a self-defeating strategy that consolidates early advantages of lucky — rather than necessarily talented — individuals. Using an agent-based numerical simulation with N agents selecting among M actions, the study contrasts two action-selection mechanisms: imitation of better-ranked peers (parameterised by q) and random exploration (serendipity). Key findings demonstrate that higher imitation propensity (high q) increases aggregate utility but simultaneously raises inequality (measured via Gini coefficient), reduces correlation between agents' intrinsic fitness and ranking outcomes, homogenizes the action space, and freezes ranking mobility. Conversely, lower imitation propensity (low q) preserves upward ranking mobility, maintains diversity of strategies, and produces outcomes more aligned with agents' intrinsic capabilities. The model draws on Goodhart's Law, the Hawthorne effect, and empirical parallels in academia, financial markets, and sports. The author concludes that performance ranking systems, as currently implemented, structurally undermine the meritocratic goals they purport to serve. Key insights: Imitation of top performers increases aggregate utility but produces higher inequality and lower meritocracy — the bottom 10% of agents eventually accumulate less utility under high-imitation regimes than under random action selection. Rankings tend to freeze under high imitation: early 'lucky winners' consolidate their positions regardless of intrinsic talent, creating a negative feedback loop where attempts to climb rankings through imitation further entrench existing hierarchies. Serendipity (random action exploration) acts as a double-edged mechanism — it initially creates lucky winners disconnected from talent, but at low imitation levels it partially restores meritocracy by enabling upward mobility and preserving diversity of strategies. Practical takeaways: Organizations relying on public relative performance feedback (PRF) and best-practice dissemination may observe aggregate productivity gains while simultaneously generating increasing inequality and reduced meritocratic alignment — these outcomes are not mutually exclusive. Environments that allow for independent, exploratory approaches to performance (analogous to low-q serendipity) are associated in this model with greater ranking fluidity and stronger correlation between individual capability and measured outcomes.